The surging movement to restore a Constitutional republic has often been confounded by the lack of real alternatives in important elections, leading to voter apathy and fruitless protest votes for third parties. The recent debacle of John McCain's nomination and his feigned campaign has perplexed conservatives who cannot understand how a relatively unknown two-year Senator with radical communist ties was allowed nearly unchallenged reign on what was essentially a victory lap. This cannot be a coincidence, and if we are to take the writings of KGB-defector Anatoliy Golytsin seriously, it is not.
For an example of the deceptive nature of opposition politics in the former USSR, one need not look further than Russia itself. In the State Duma, Russia's supposed "people's house," Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's "United Russia" faction (almost laughingly titled in light of the intentionally fracturing tactics of the FSB, the freshly re-titled KGB), is supposedly opposed by the insane representatives of the "opposition," most famously, the incendiary Vladimir Zhironovsky of the LDP faction. In Russia, opposition is often a farce; if it is not a farce, it is crushed (see imprisoned "oligarch" Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov, e.g.).
As conservatives are left bewildered by the lack of outrage in the Republican party at the Democrats' desolation of the Constitutional republic, we should consider that the would-be oligarchs in both parties could be playing the American voters for fools.
From Anatoliy Golytsin's The Perestroika Deception [See pp. 75-92]:
THE FOURTH KEY: LENIN'S 'FORGING OF NEW AND OLD FORMS' FOR DEVELOPING SOCIALISM, AND CHICHERIN'S IDEA OF FALSE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS THROUGH THE ADMISSION OF NON-COMMUNISTS
The West has failed to understand another aspect of the introduction of false, controlled 'democratic' and 'non-Communist' structures in the USSR and Eastern Europe which the Communists have succeeded in concealing. This is that the basis of these structures rests on ideas expressed by Lenin and his able Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, during the NEP period.
One key to understanding this basis lies in Lenin's advice to Communist Parties 'to study, to search for, to find and to grasp the one particular powerful, specifically national tactic which will solve our international task... until the final victory of Communism'. All parties, advised Lenin, must rid themselves of the radical phraseology of the Left Wing. They must be ready to use a variety of tactics, old and new, legal and illegal. 'International Communism', he went on, 'must subordinate to itself not only new, but old forms too - not simply to reconcile the new with the old, but to forge all forms, new and old, into a single weapon which will bring full, complete and decisive victory for Communism'. Following Lenin's advice, the Soviet strategists and Arbatov's Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada have studied Western democracy, its political processes and its media.
It is particularly revealing that Aleksandr Yakovlev, a leading strategist of 'perestroika', Yevgeniy Primakov, another leading strategist, Tatyana Zaslavskaya [see page 26], an economist and public opinion institute director, and Nikolay Shmelev, a leading economist behind 'perestroika', all studied in the United States. Drawing on Lenin's advice, these strategists have borrowed the forms of Western democracy, filled them with new Communist content and introduced them in the USSR and Eastern Europe as means for laying down the basis for convergence and as powerful new weapons to bring about the world victory of Communism.
It is also likely that prominent agents of influence in the West with knowledge of American conditions will have suggested that, to conquer the United States, Communism would have to be Americanised and dressed in 'democratic' garb. The introduction of deceptive 'democratic' forms in the Communist world is a further instance of the use for the purposes of strategy of the Bloc's political and security potential, and particularly of controlled 'political opposition'.
Another key to understanding these 'democratic' forms is the well known advice given by Chicherin to Lenin. On 20 January 1922, shortly before the Genoa Conference, Chicherin wrote to Lenin:
'In case the Americans insist on representative institutions, don't you think that, for solid compensation, we can deceive them by making a small ideological concession which would not have any practical meaning? For example, we can allow the presence of three representatives of the non-working class in the body of 2,000 members. Such a step can be presented to the Americans as a representative institution' [Questions of History of the CPSU, Number 4,1962, page 152]. [See: "Bi-partisanship."]
Because of the crisis in Soviet Russia at the time and the narrow political base of the regime, Lenin rejected Chicherin's rather modest deception proposal. But the idea has been taken up on a massive scale by Lenin's successors.
THE FIFTH KEY: THE DEPLOYMENT OF CONTROLLED 'POLITICAL OPPOSITION' IN 'DEMOCRATIC' AND 'NON-COMMUNIST' STRUCTURES
Given the maturity of the present Communist regimes, the strength of their political and security potential and the long period of preparation of controlled 'political opposition', these regimes are in a position to give representatives of 'non-Communist' parties a third, a half or even more of the seats in their governments and parliaments so as to present these institutions as 'representative' and 'democratic'. It should be noted that Chicherin's letter to Lenin was held as a state secret until its publication in 1962, after the adoption of the strategy. The timing of its publication shows the letter's relevance to that strategy.
The deployment of controlled 'political opposition' has rendered possible the introduction of deceptive 'non-Communist' and 'democratic' structures. Even so-called free elections do not present a problem for the Communist Parties. Because of their secret partnership with the 'opposition', the Communist Parties are always in a winning situation. It is their candidates - Communist or 'non-Communist' -who always win. No other truly independent candidates exist.
This is the new statecraft of the Communist Parties and their security services: it is a new form for developing socialism. Its introduction allows the Communist Parties to broaden their political base and, in accordance with a decision of the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, to replace the outlived concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' with the new concept of 'the state of the whole people' while maintaining their power and strengthening their actual leading role. [Marxist-Leninist tactics, Hegelian philosophy.]
The Communists have succeeded in concealing from the West that the 'non-Communist' parties are secret partners of the Communists, not alternatives or rivals to them, and that the new power structures, though they have democratic form, are in reality more viable and effective structures introduced and guided by Communist Parties with a broader base. Because of this Communist control, the Bloc countries are not true democracies and cannot become so in the future. The earlier acceptance of false 'political opposition' by the West as genuine has led logically to the present uncritical acceptance of deceptive 'democracy' as true democracy. [...]